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Abstract 
Communication is faster than ever. Innovations in low cost network computing 
have brought an era in which people can effortlessly and instantaneously view and post 
opinions collaboratively with others across the world. With such an infrastructure of 
public message boards, chat rooms and instant messaging systems, there is also a large 
potential for abuse by people wishing to capitalize on such open services by posting 
unsolicited advertisements. 
An entire industry has been constructed around the prevention of unsolicited 
electronic advertisements (SPAM). This thesis examines various techniques for 
preventing SPAM, focusing on Completely Automated Public Turing Tests to Tell 
Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA), a challenge/response technique where an 
image is displayed with text that is heavily distorted. It also examines the feasibility of 
breaking CAPTCHA programmatically, alternatives to CAPTCHA based on filtering, 
improvements to CAPTCHA using photo recognition and avoiding the need for 
CAPTCHA using naïve approaches.  
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Chapter I – Introduction 
People who frequently use the Internet for communication, social networking and 
purchases often come across web pages that request that they type the value of an image 
with distorted text into an input box. The purpose of such requests is to prove that the 
requester is in fact human and not an automated computer program. This challenge 
response test is what is known as a Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell 
Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA). The term was originally coined by several 
developers at Carnegie Mellon University, and the school’s Computer Science 
Department currently holds the trademark on the acronym [1]. 
There is a directed effort by commercial interests to break CAPTCHAs, that is to 
create computer programs to solve the puzzles in order to post unsolicited messages and 
advertisements. Many such attempts are similar to the nature of attempting to get 
messages past filters for unsolicited e-mail (also known as SPAM). There are also 
noncommercial interests in breaking CAPTCHA, either to improve the CAPTCHA itself, 
force developers to find alternatives by showing CAPTCHA is broken, or general 
curiosity in bettering the field of Computer Science. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
My research focuses on three major problems: 
1. Is it possible to break common distorted text based CAPTCHA, i.e. 
recognize and answer challenges programmatically, using currently 
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available open source tools for filtering and character recognition?  
2. How can CAPTCHA be improved? Are there other challenges that can be 
created that are easier for humans to answer and more challenging for 
computers to respond to programmatically? 
3. How effective is CAPTCHA against combating SPAM compared to other 
prevention techniques? 
1.2 Explanation of the Problems 
Unsolicited bulk e-mail, advertisements posted to public forms, blogs and bulletin 
boards and other forms of SPAM are a major problem on the Internet for several reasons. 
The cost of sending unsolicited advertisements is relatively cheap but consumes large 
amounts of bandwidth causing cost to be shifted to regular consumers. A majority of 
SPAM is also fraud and can cause uninformed end-users to lose a considerable amount of 
money [2]. Because of these facts, multimillion dollar industries arose simply to identify 
and combat SPAM, which increases costs to service providers, the cost of entry for 
legitimate businesses and overall costs for end users.  
Public forums, bulletin boards and blogs are particularly susceptible to SPAM 
posting because they are designed to facilitate a high degree of open interaction and 
discussion with either no verification or simple registration. CAPTCHA becomes 
important for these services to prevent automated scripts from flooding public discussion 
areas. Such postings can make legitimate websites completely unusable. However, 
CAPTCHA does make it more difficult for visually impaired users to participate in such 
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discussions. My research into attempting to break CAPTCHA is intended to answer the 
question: is CAPTCHA still a viable form of protection against SPAM? 
Regardless of the solution to the first problem, my research also examines 
alternatives to the traditional distorted text based CAPTCHA and attempts to improve on 
such techniques and provide innovative approaches. To these ends, I have developed an 
application that can be integrated into existing websites and that provides a new form of 
photograph based CAPTCHA utilizing a vast library of user contributed photographs and 
metadata on those photographs to generate challenges.  
CAPTCHA challenges can potentially prevent SPAM but have a considerable 
number of drawbacks, primarily the inability for the visually impaired to answer most 
challenges. Many websites and content management systems have attempted to use 
traditional SPAM filtering techniques such as those used to prevent unsolicited e-mail. 
The final problem my research addresses is the effectiveness of non-CAPTCHA 
techniques for preventing SPAM versus CAPTCHA challenges. 
1.3 Understanding CAPTCHA 
The goals of CAPTCHA are to eliminate automated robots and scripts from using 
a website as a means of spreading unsolicited advertisements, inflating rankings in search 
engines and distributing viruses. Although an individual could still accomplish these 
tasks, using an automated program makes the distribution of SPAM much faster, causes 
the damage to be more widespread and makes the results considerably more difficult to 
clean up. 
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At one time a simple image with slightly distorted text may have been enough to 
confuse most web robots and allow web designers to validate human users; however, the 
presence of such text has led programmers to create even more sophisticated robots 
capable of using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) algorithms —the same types of 
algorithms used by scanner software to convert scanned documents into text— to 
recognize the text within the images.  
Such innovations have led to more complicated CAPTCHA, which involves 
multi-colored distorted text on altered backgrounds that contain added lines, noise and 
possible faded and rotated characters that are not part of the CAPTCHA itself [Figure 1] 
[3]. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Example of a CAPTCHA 
 
One of the foundations of security in the field of Computer Science is the ability 
to create a process or algorithm that is very easy to do computationally but is very 
difficult to undo. This foundation is used in asymmetric or public/private key encryption, 
which utilizes keys based on the products of two large prime numbers: something that is 
very easy to do but difficult to undo due to the complexity of factoring products of prime 
numbers. This same concept applies to the idea of CAPTCHA, although in a slightly 
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different context. 
With CAPTCHA, a computer program must test the users to see if they are 
human. By doing so, the program needs to generate a test, to which it knows the answer, 
but which cannot be solved programmatically. There is an odd paradox here where the 
program generates a test and grades it for correctness; a test that the program itself cannot 
pass [4]. 
CAPTCHA is considered an example of a Reverse Turing Test. In a traditional 
Turing Test, software developers attempt to generate a program that can simulate written 
human communication. Typically a user will attempt to communicate with the Turing 
Machine over a text message system to determine if he or she is talking to a real person 
or a computer on the remote end. Although there is much debate about whether it is 
theoretically possible to create a true Turing Test or Reverse Turing Test [5], the concept 
itself does lend itself to many limitations, technical problems and ethical boundaries 
when dealing with real people. 
Simply put, CAPTCHA works because, even with the advancement and 
innovations in computing technology over the past several decades, there are still tasks 
that can be accomplished faster and more easily by humans than they can by computers; 
specifically simple puzzles that involve images, natural language processing or a 
combination of the two.  
Current advancements in image recognition, shape recognition, artificial 
intelligence and machine learning may tip that scale back in favor of computer algorithms 
in solving CAPTCHA challenges. Therefore, programmers and security experts must be 
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diligent in finding new techniques to correctly identify humans, prevent SPAM and 
maintain security in website models.  
1.4 Types of CAPTCHA 
The most prevalent form of CAPTCHA is an image with distorted text, although 
there are many others. A CAPTCHA needs to be able to automatically determine if the 
end user is human or a program. Therefore, any test that is easy for a human to solve yet 
difficult to write an automated program for can be considered a CAPTCHA. Recent 
advancements have led to CAPTCHAs based on pictures, word puzzles, spoken audio 
and other challenges, each with their own strengths and weaknesses.  
1.4.1 Word Puzzles 
One such technique is implemented as a plugin for the commercial bulletin board 
software, vBulletin. "NoSpam! - an alternative to CAPTCHA images" is a plugin 
designed by a programmer who goes by the handle Antialiasis [6]. The plugin allows a 
board administrator to define a set of questions and answers. The questions can be simple 
(e.g. "What is 2 + 2?") or technical questions related to the forum. The author also 
suggests embedding an image and asking the question about the image itself.   
The advantages to such an approach include accessibility to the visually impaired 
as well as providing a less cumbersome mechanism of distorted text which sometimes 
takes users several tries to decipher correctly. For this technique to be effective, there 
needs to be a considerably large number of questions so that a programmer simply does 
not farm the website for all the possible challenge responses. The questions also need to 
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be simple enough to be quickly and easily answered. A similar tool for Wordpress, WP-
Gatekeeper, offers challenge questions such as "How do you spell the color blue?" [7] 
However, questions such as these could eventually be circumvented by a sophisticated 
natural language processor. 
1.4.2 Sound Based 
Some CAPTCHAs provide a sound file alternative for uses that are visually 
impaired. This allows the user to listen to an audio clip, typically one that is heavily 
distorted, as a means to identify the text in a visual CAPTCHA. Although a sound only 
alternative is a possibility, such an implementation would be inaccessible to those who 
have hearing impairments, users who are at computers without sound cards such as those 
in libraries or users who are in noisy environments such as coffee shops or public 
wireless locations.  
Sound CAPTCHAs also run into the same limitations as picture based 
CAPTCHAs as they require large numbers of voice recordings to be effective. One 
solution is automatically generated sounds using voice-synthesizing software; however, 
such sound based challenges could be circumvented using voice recognition software. 
Many audio challenges also add in background noise and various other voices chattering. 
Although this addition makes it more difficult for voice recognition programs to extract 
the correct response, it can also make it difficult for humans to understand what the 
correct response should be. 
The current official version of CAPTCHA created by the term’s trademark holder, 
Carnegie Mellon University, named reCAPTCHA, has support for an auditory 
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CAPTCHA for users who are visually impaired. In addition, reCAPTCHA is more useful 
than just a SPAM prevention mechanism. It actually helps facilitate digitizing books into 
an electronic form [Figure 2].  
 
 
Figure 2 - reCAPTCHA Example 
 
It works by providing two words, one which is known and the other taken from a 
book digitalization project that an optical character recognition (OCR) program could not 
correctly identify with confidence. If the CAPTCHA is validated correctly with the 
known word, the user submitted value of the unknown word is stored. The same 
unknown word is presented to multiple people to gain a total confidence score on what 
the word actually is [8].  
1.4.3 Photograph Identification 
One means of determining if an individual is human is by using a matrix of 
photographs. A challenge is presented where the user is asked to select a set of photos 
which have something in common with one another. An example is the KittenAuth 
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project by Oli Warner. Using KittenAuth, a user is presented with a series of nine images 
[Figure 3]. The user must pick out the three which are kittens in order to prove he or she 
is human [9]. 
The advantage to such a challenge is that for people who are visually impaired, it 
may be easier to recognize photographs than it is to read distorted text challenges. The 
disadvantage is that a massive repository of both kitten and non-kitten related photos 
would be necessary for such a system to be practical against SPAM prevention. If the 
program contained only a few hundred photos, given enough time, an attacker could 
manually identify many of the kittens and then proceeded to using image comparison 
techniques to break the challenge and send automated requests. 
 
 
Figure 3 - KittenAuth Photo-Based CAPTCHA 
 
Part of my research deals with this specific type of CAPTCHA challenge and 
improves it to be more robust and less vulnerable to attack by utilizing a larger public 
repository of images. The result is an application called FlickMeCaptcha, which interacts 
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with the popular photo sharing website Flickr and is covered in more detail in Chapters 3 
and 4.   
1.5 Alternatives to CAPTCHA 
1.5.1 Bayesian Networks 
There are solutions that simply test the contents of the message body itself rather 
than add an additional CAPTCHA test, similar to how e-mail SPAM filters work. Early 
spam filters for e-mail used developer defined rules such as searching e-mail for specific 
types of websites or words and phrases. As spammers became adept at circumventing sets 
of known rules and the rules themselves grew to enormous sizes, more dynamic 
approaches based on machine learning came into play.  
Modern SPAM filters are based on the concept of a naïve Bayes classifier, also 
known as a Bayesian Network. In 1998, Sahami and others trained the first of such filters 
with promising results [10]. Today, the same Bayesian filtering has been incorporated 
into many end user applications and SPAM filters such as Mozilla Thunderbird and the 
free project SpamAssassin [11].  
Bayesian Networks work off a probabilistic graph model. Under the surface they 
are standard acyclic directed graphs that can be trained for classification using machine 
learning techniques. Given a certain threshold they can be trained to return, within the 
tolerance of a given percentage, items that are likely to be SPAM.  
Bayesian Networks are not the perfect solution to preventing SPAM since they 
still have several problems when used with websites. E-mail based filters have the 
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advantage of also being able to perform checks based on e-mail headers, reverse domain 
name service (DNS) lookups and other techniques in addition to the Bayesian analysis to 
derive a total confidence score. On a website where user input is available, many of these 
options are not available and the filter must determine the legitimacy of the posted item 
based solely on the text entered. 
Another common problem is Bayesian Filtering Poisoning. Using this technique, 
a spammer incorporates several legitimate words together with the SPAM so the filter 
either lets the message through or incorrectly marks legitimate e-mails as SPAM leading 
to false positives within the SPAM filter. One particularly tricky example involves using 
text that is the same color as the background [Figure 4]. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Seemingly Legitimate Text  
 
 
Figure 5 - Hidden SPAM 
 
Using changes in text and background color, an e-mail that seems like an 
unsolicited advertisement to the user may pass through a SPAM filter. Highlighting the 
text reveals the characters that are used to run the words together [Figure 5] [12].  
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Utilizing a Bayesian Network based filter on user submitted input could be used 
as an alternative to CAPTCHA. The advantages include not bothering the user with the 
CAPTCHA puzzle and not taking into consideration users who may be visually impaired 
and unable to read the challenge. However, there is the possibly that the filter could 
identify false positives and incorrectly label legitimate content as SPAM. 
In my research I examined several non-CAPTCHA based alternatives that 
examine the contents of messages to determine if they are SPAM. Such alternatives 
include Akismet [13], Mollom [14] and Defensio [15]. These alternatives are 
implemented as web based services that can be accessed through a publicly available 
interface. All of them are free for non-commercial use with optional licenses for 
businesses and large websites. Each also has plugins for popular content management 
systems such as Wordpress, Drupal and Movable Type. They most likely implement a 
series of techniques such as Bayesian Networks and blacklists although their exact 
techniques are kept secret to prevent attackers from being able to circumvent the systems.   
1.5.2 The Naïve Approach  
There is a less sophisticated approach to preventing SPAM based on the 
assumption that automated scripts written to post SPAM are not designed to be very 
intelligent. In other words, the programmers that create SPAM posting scripts design 
them to post as many websites as possible without paying much attention to any other 
content on the page. An example of a naïve approach is placing an input field on a 
website and then changing its display property in the style sheet to make it invisible. A 
simple automated program would most likely not be designed to download and parse the 
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style sheet and would fill out the form field that could not be seen in a real web browser, 
clearly indicating the post is SPAM. 
In my research I examine naïve approaches used on websites. Naïve techniques 
do not provide a high degree of SPAM prevention and can easily be circumvented, 
however the cost and effort for identifying and circumventing these implementations is 
often not economical for posting SPAM to small websites.  
1.6 Ethical Concerns in Using and Breaking CAPTCHA 
Although added visual distortions may make it more difficult for a program to 
efficiently identify the characters, these distortions pose a second challenge of also 
making it more difficult for humans to identify the characters as well, especially since 
one in twelve people in the United States have some form of color blindness [16]. Being 
color deficient in one or more major color group can make it difficult if not impossible to 
identify characters in CAPTCHA.  
There are many ethical dilemmas found both in using CAPTCHA and in trying to 
circumvent or break CAPTCHA. Issues of legality, security and access for those with 
visual impairments are just a few of the many issues surrounding both CAPTCHA and 
various other SPAM prevention technologies. Some companies have issued cease and 
desist orders against developers and companies who create software to circumvent 
CAPTCHA while others have taken software developers to court. The issues that arise 
begin to congeal over the very idea of creating illegal software. The simple act of 
developing software brings up questions of liability when it comes to damages, whether 
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real or virtual, when faced with the concept types of software that are defined as illegal to 
develop. 
One of the more recent and predominant cases involving software that 
circumvents CAPTCHA is in the case of TicketMaster vs. RMG. TicketMaster found that 
certain ticket brokers were purchasing large numbers of tickets in very small amounts of 
time. Some of these brokers used a service from RMG called ticketbrokertools.com 
which was available only to RMG clients. Through cooperation with brokers, 
TicketMaster found that RMG's PurchaseMaster software actually made a slew of 
automated requests to TicketMaster's website. RMG had developed software to break the 
CAPTCHA used by TicketMaster and funneled the request through their client's PCs to 
make the request look like they were coming from several sources [17]. 
Another questionable ethical practice involves employing people to solve massive 
amounts of CAPTCHA problems in a farming type situation. Technically a real human 
would be solving the problems; however, it would be for the purposes of posting SPAM 
or launching some type of attack. There are widespread, although unsubstantiated, reports 
of such farming [18], however the feasibility of such a concept comes into serious 
question. Jeff Atwood of the website Coding Horror puts the feasibility of such an 
operation into perspective in the follow blog article: 
 
“Let's say spammers set up a sweatshop to employ people to look at 
computer screens and answer CAPTCHA challenges. They get to send one 
message for each challenge passed. Assuming 10 seconds per challenge, 
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and paying roughly $5 per hour, that represents $14 per thousand 
messages [sic]. A typical spam run of 1 million messages per day would 
cost $14,000 per day and require 116 people working 24/7. 
This would break the economic model used by most current spammers. A 
recent Wired article showed one spammer earning $10 for each successful 
sale. At that rate, the cost of $14,000 for 1,000,000 spam emails requires a 
1 in 1000 success rate just to break even, whereas current spammers are 
managing a 1 in 100,000 or even 1 in 1,000,000 success rate [19].”   
 
A more viable model would be to get real people to solve CAPTCHA challenges 
either for free or in exchange for something with insignificant cost. According to 
Computer World Magazine, such a technique was implemented by one group using a 
virtual stripper [20]. The animated image of the stripper would gradually remove clothing 
as users enter in solutions to CAPTCHAs. Each CATPCHA was actually taken from 
Yahoo’s e-mail service and the solutions were used to generate a collection of accounts to 
use for spamming purposes.  
There are many ethical considerations surrounding CAPTCHA. As far as their 
use, the primary concern is accessibility for those who are impaired. Improvement in the 
use of audio and word puzzle substitutes has greatly reduced this concert in newer 
implementations.  
As far as solving CAPTCHA programmatically, issues have been raised as to the 
legality of breaking CAPTCHA for the purpose of sales. The Ticketmaster vs RMG 
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shows that the courts hold that development of software specifically for the purpose of 
violating TicketMaster’s terms of service is illegal, however, this raises further concerns 
about the ethics of creating software to break CAPTCHA for research purposes, in an 
effort to find either better CAPTCHA or to enhance the field of artificial intelligence as a 
whole. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
Applications designed to programmatically break CAPTCHA do not need to have 
a high degree of accuracy. Even if a program can only get ten percent of the image 
challenges correct, it could access and submit to a page several hundred times a minute 
negating the inaccuracy. Typically the more SPAM prone websites will also add monitors 
that can detect several connection attempts by a single client in a short interval and will 
ban such connections. In this sense software that prevents Denial of Service attacks has 
the side-effect of also helping deflect CAPTCHA breaking attacks. This forces spammers 
to find ways of getting other clients to make such attempts, either by means of spreading 
viruses, using unsecured open proxy servers or coaxing individuals with offers of free 
services or money. 
There has been considerable research put forth into creating algorithms that can 
identify and successfully answer CAPTCHA challenges. There are several challenges 
facing image analysis. Each of the papers I examined dealt with issues of segmentation, 
that is separating individual letters in a CAPTCHA challenge, and shape recognition, that 
is identifying individual characters or glyphs.  
Before beginning my own experiments and writing my own applications, I studied 
existing academic research as well as individual blogs and user experience. I read the 
works of Chellapilla and Simard who authored the paper Using Machine Learning to 
Break Visual Human Interaction Proofs [21], Mori and Malik who wrote Breaking a 
Visual CAPTCHA [22], Hocevar who created a program called PWNtcha [24] that 
attempted to circumvent several common forms of CAPTCHA, and Jeff Atwood of the 
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blog Coding Horror [19] who comments on the state of CAPTCHA breaking as well as 
using a naïve approach to prevent SPAM.  
2.1 Chellapill and Simard 
In the paper Using Machine Learning to Break Visual Human Interaction Proofs, 
Chellapilla and Simard [21], two software engineers from Microsoft, examine breaking 
hard CAPTCHA using a combination of recognition, machine learning algorithms and 
segmentation techniques. During the course of their research, they determine that most 
simple CAPTCHAs, which they referred to as Human Interaction Proofs or HIPs, were 
simple recognition problems while the harder ones required significantly more complex 
segmentation algorithms.  
For simple CAPTCHAs such as Milblocks, Chellapilla and Simard were able to 
achieve an end-to-end segmentation success rate of 88.8% with a 95.9% recognition for 
those correctly segmented. Similarly, the Register CAPTCHA had a 95.4% segmentation 
success rate with an 87.1% recognition rate of successful segmentation. Harder 
CAPTCHAs to segment, such as Ticketmaster's, which uses diagonal intersecting lines, 
yielded a segmentation success rate of only 16.6%. Of those correctly segmented, the 
recognition rate was 82.3%. Their conclusions showed that once segmentation can be 
broken, the reaming recognition problem can be solved easily with a machine learning 
algorithm.  
Chellapilla and Simard pose the question: What makes segmenting characters in 
CAPTCHA difficult? Their analysis shows that segmentation is very computationally 
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expensive requiring examination of many different patterns to locate candidates. The 
segmentation functions are also very complex because they must identify patterns over 
the set of all possible valid and invalid patterns, which is substantially more difficult than 
traditional classification problems. Finally, identifying symbols over a set of valid and 
invalid candidates is a combinational problem, which can very quickly explode into a 
high order problem size. For example correctly identifying 10 characters among 20 
candidates has a 1 in 184,756 (20 choose 10) chance in succeeding by random guessing 
[21]. 
Unlike Chellapilla and Simard, in my own research I do not attempt to use a 
machine learning algorithm to analyze CAPTCHA challenges. Instead I use freely 
available optical character recognition (OCR) software combined with image filtering 
over a large set of challenges. The software I have developed is modularized to 
accommodate a variety of different filtering techniques. Using an object orientated 
approach, the analysis tool can be easily expanded to accommodate different filters and 
analyzers and then perform experiments using different combinations of filters and 
analyzers to gather results.  
The software I designed attempts to test several different CAPTCHA scripts with 
a set of analysis techniques. Although it gathers data on the amount of both correct letters 
and correct words, it does not have a means of gathering data on correct segmentation. 
2.2 Mori and Malik 
One of the more famous examples of defeating CAPTCHA is documented in the 
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paper Breaking a Visual CAPTCHA by Greg Mori and Jitendra Malik from the 
University of California Berkeley and Simon Fraser University, respectively [22]. They 
took on the challenge of breaking Gimpy and EZ-Gimpy, the Yahoo CAPTCHA systems. 
Using shape recognition techniques, the one word EZ-Gimpy CAPTCHA could be 
broken 92% of the time, while the more difficult two overlaid word Gimpy CAPTCHA 
could still be broken 33% of the time.  
The technique employed by Mori and Malik involves three very basic steps at its 
highest level. First, each individual shape is identified and a list of possible letters 
assigned to it. Second, a set is composed by linking every possible combination of the 
letters. Third, the set is compared to a dictionary to find the actual word the image is 
displaying [23]. This technique has obvious limits as the EZ-Gimpy system uses actual 
dictionary words and not random letters. Although this makes the system easier for a 
human to use, it also makes it significantly easier to automatically decipher.   
My own research uses CAPTCHA scripts which generate random characters 
instead of dictionary words. Because of this my engine does not attempt to try to match 
potential choices with a dictionary; but attempts to analyze each image individually and 
gathers data on the percentage of correct letters and correct challenges. 
2.3 Hocevar 
Sam Hocevar, a developer, has worked diligently on his project "PWNtcha" 
which stands for "Pretend We're Not a Turing Computer but a Human Antagonist." 
Hocevar has discovered poorly designed generation techniques in many of the common 
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forms of CAPTCHA used in a variety of bulletin board and blogging software which 
allows them to be easily deciphered [Figure 6] [24]. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Chart outlining several types of easily broken CAPTCHA  
 
Hocevar claims that his program is more of a toolkit for image filtering and 
manipulation than a general purpose decoder. He can not feed any CAPTCHA to it, but 
must custom tailor it to the type of CAPTCHA presented to it. His website provides 
examples of significantly harder CAPTCHAs that he still cannot break and is unsure if he 
will ever be able to [Figure 7]. 
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Figure 7 - Chart outlining several types of hard CAPTCHA 
 
Sam Hocevar originally published his results from the PWNtcha project in 2004, 
however he offered no source code. Unlike the aforementioned studies, he also did not 
publish detailed methodology on how he accomplished his results stating ethical reasons. 
Because of this, as opposed to more traditional studies, Hocevar's results were not 
reproducible. In 2008, he did release the source code to PWNtcha publicly, stating that 
the algorithms he used were for outdated CAPTCHAs that were no longer in use. 
2.4 Atwood 
Jeff Atwood, writer for the blog Coding Horror, described how his blog uses a 
"naïve CAPTCHA" meaning the CAPTCHA does not change. It uses the same challenge 
presented continually, yet the author claimed he has received fewer than ten SPAM 
messages and that the naïve approach was 99.9% effective against stopping SPAM [19]. 
Atwood's article isn't about naïve approaches specifically, but rather it explains why 
CAPTCHA isn't broken. He claims that although a few CAPTCHA-defeating proof of 
concepts have been published, many major websites such as Google, Yahoo and Hotmail 
still use CAPTCHA. 
Furthermore, Atwood makes the argument that, "The real secret to CAPTCHA is 
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that it hits spammers where they are most vulnerable: in the pocketbook. The minute you 
put up a computational barrier, the entire economic model of SPAM comes crashing 
down [19]."  
This argument works logically when examining the previously mentioned 
research of Chellapilla and Simard [21], Mori and Malik [22] and Hocevar [24]. In all of 
the mentioned examples where CAPTCHA was broken, the researchers had to design 
algorithms for a specific CAPTCHA. In the case of RMG vs. Ticketmaster [17], a 
situation can be seen where the financial benefits of breaking CAPTCHA outweigh the 
research costs.  
In the case of smaller websites, it is not economically feasible to research 
algorithms for every possible CAPTCHA type. Rather it is easier to submit SPAM to 
every form that can be found and hope that some of them post to the website. I've 
experienced this on my personal website, http://sumdog.com, where I incorporated 
CaptchaPHP into the guestbook over two years ago to combat rising levels of SPAM. 
The amount SPAM I receive dropped from several messages a week to fewer than ten 
SPAM posts over the entire course of its implementation. 
The importance of Atwood's work in regards to my own research is to show that 
SPAM can be prevented by using unsophisticated techniques. With Atwood's very simple 
naïve CAPTCHA, he was able to successfully reduce the amount of SPAM posted on his 
website. My research into both naïve and non-CAPTCHA based approaches show that 
there isn't an effective way to measure or compare the effectiveness of such approaches 
over regular CAPTCHA challenges. Still, this information is important to note as it is 
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significant to the general field of SPAM prevention. 
2.5 Conclusions 
From studying existing ventures into breaking CAPTCHA, there has been a 
considerable amount of research done on breaking CAPTCHA by independent 
researchers, major universities and even major corporations. Although many groups will 
publish results as well as complex methodology, few will post actual source code, most 
likely for ethical reasons.  
What are considered easy cases have been solved for a considerable amount of 
time and require only simple image filtering in combination with shape recognition to 
solve. Harder cases may require additional work with segmentation and machine 
learning, yet some researchers have been able to get reasonable success rates even with 
such cases. The hardest challenges are images that use varying colors, intersecting lines, 
words layered upon words and various other techniques that make filtering the original 
characters very difficult while still maintaining easy visibility for human readers.  
Even with all these innovations in segmentation, filtering and recognition, none of 
the aforementioned studies have a general case algorithm to work universally on all 
CAPTCHAs. The methodology must be customized and tailored for each type; therefore, 
attacks are most often targeted, either to specific types of challenges or to a single 
particular website of high interest to an attacker.  
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Chapter 3 – Research and Experiments 
My research focuses on three distinct yet related problems. One is to attempt and 
break existing distorted word based CAPTCHA using freely available tools, the second is 
to create or improve a form of CAPTCHA and the third is to compare the effectiveness of 
using CAPTCHA based alternatives. The first problem involves writing an application to 
compare different approaches to breaking CAPTCHA. The second involves creating a 
script to implement a new form of photo identification base CAPTCHA. The third 
problem involves examining statistics from services which provider alternatives to 
CAPTCHA. 
In this chapter I describe the Java based BMCB engine I designed to generate data 
sets of CAPTCHA images and run experiments against those sets using optical character 
recognition applications. I also cover FlickMeCaptcha, a PHP add-in I designed to be 
easy to integrate into existing websites that offers an improvement on photo-based 
CAPTCHA. Finally, I examine Akismet, an alternative to CAPTCHA which examines 
website submissions the same way e-mail filters examine messages for SPAM and 
compare its effectiveness to CAPTCHA. 
3.1 BMCB Engine 
The BMCB engine generates several sets of CAPTCHA images with known 
answers and stores those answers and their corresponding files in a database. The engine 
can then be used to apply image filtering, segmentation (separating individual characters 
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into sub images) and analysis techniques to the image sets and see how well the computer 
functions in determining the text in the CAPTCHA images. The engine is dynamic 
enough that it can be used for analyzing each image independently or using machine 
learning to train an analyzer with one of the data sets.  
All of the generators, filters, segmentators and analyzers that come with the 
engine are based on existing open source technologies, however they can all easily be 
expanded to incorporate various technologies and algorithms. Most of the default 
analyzers are wrappers for open source Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. 
By itself, the OCR software would have difficulty interpreting the highly distorted 
images, therefore the use of filtering and segmentation on the images was attempted to 
see if they would improve the OCR software’s ability to correctly identify challenges. 
3.1.1 Experiment Constraints 
The engine is highly adaptable with the ability to set constraints within the 
workflow classes. In the experiments detailed within this paper, several open source 
CAPTCHA generators were modified to take in an argument from the command line in 
order to create a set of known CAPTCHA challenge images and responses. The following 
constraints were used: 
• The CAPTCHAs consist of a set of random letters distorted in the common image 
based CAPTCHA 
• All CAPTCHAs in a given data set are all a fixed length of five characters 
• CAPTCHAs only contain letters, no numbers, with the challenge response being 
case insensitive 
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• Each CAPTCHA set consists of 1000 challenge response images 
The constraints may seem restrictive, however they allow the design of the engine 
to focus on a very narrow scope and solve simple problems before progressing on to the 
general case.  
3.1.2 Set Generation 
In order to generate a set of known CAPTCHA challenges, common open source 
script need to be slightly modified. The engine has a default Command Line Generator 
class that will take any program given to it, pass that program the CAPTCHA letters as 
the first argument and the path to where the distorted image should be written as the 
second. Most generation scripts can easily be modified by altering the methods used to 
randomly generate the text within the image as well as the function used to display the 
image on the webpage.  
Four different CAPTCHA generation scripts were used with the engine. Three of 
them are PHP based open source CAPTCHA tools: CaptchaPHP [25], Freecap [26] and 
Gotcha [27]. The final script is a custom one that creates an undistorted image in an 
easily readable font to be used for the trivial case to test the accuracy of the analyzers 
[Figure 8]. 
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Figure 8 - Types of CAPTCHA 
3.1.3 Image Filtering  
The default filtering class that comes with the engine is a wrapper for the 
command line file manipulation tool ImageMagick. ImageMagick is an open source tool 
used to programmatically perform common image manipulation tasks such as brightness, 
contrast, color adjustment, edge detection, resizing, transformation, etc.  
Simple effects such as brightness and contrast adjustment can greatly affect the 
readability of the image, both by humans and character recognition programs. 
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ImageMagick uses the “modulate” parameter to adjust brightness and contrast [Figure 9 -
- Figure 10]. 
 
 
Figure 9 - Original CAPTCHA 
 
 
Figure 10 - CAPTCHA with Modulate Filter 110,100 Applied 
 
Noise reduction is another helpful filter when trying to examine images. The 
noise reduction filter helps to remove much of the distortion from areas of heavy 
changing contrast. Typically applied to photos to improve sharpness and remove 
imperfections, noise reduction can greatly improve the ability of an analyzer to recognize 
characters in a CAPTCHA [Figure 11 - Figure 12].  
 
 
Figure 11 - Original CAPTCHA 
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Figure 12 - Noise Reduction Filter Applied 
 
Filters can be used either by themselves or in combination with each other in 
order to remove noise from an image and make the image easier to process by shape 
recognition algorithms.  
3.1.4 Analysis  
Two basic analyzers are included with the engine. The first is GOCR, an open 
source OCR program released under the GNU General Public License, which was 
originally developed by Joerg Schulenburg who now leads a team of independent 
developers. The latest release of the software was in March of 2007 [28]. The second 
analyzer is OCRAD, an open source OCR program developed as a GNU project by the 
Free Software Foundation. Its latest release was in June of 2007 [29]. 
Both GOCR and OCRAD can be run directly from the command line. As their 
first argument, they take in a Portable Anymap (PNM) File. Their output is ASCII text in 
the standard western alphabet representing its recognition of the text [Figure 13]. 
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Figure 13 - OCRAD Analyzing a Trivial Image 
 
The Guessing Analyzer is a trivial analyzer, which must know the length of the 
CAPTCHA (i.e. it must be called using a method that provides an array of image 
segments) and then randomly guesses the letters in the image without any analysis. 
Combined with the equally trivial Even Length Segementator, the Guessing Analyzer can 
be used to test the probability of correctly randomly guessing a CAPTCHA.  
3.1.5 Experiments  
The framework is designed so that experiments can be implemented in the form 
of workflows. Experiment workflows can be as simple as just taking raw unfiltered 
images and passing them directly to the analyzer or can be as complex as passing each 
image through a series of filters, before or after being segmented and eventually 
analyzed. The tools are chained together by utilizing a standard object for holding and 
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manipulating the image. 
The most basic experiments executed here include two control situations. One 
uses the analyzers to examine the accuracy of standard text. For the case of this 
experiment, the font used to render the unaltered text was COLLEGE.TTF. It was chosen 
because, although all the characters are uniform, unique and have mostly straight edges, 
the letters are somewhat non-standard and easily confusable with one another, allowing 
the control set to test the analyzers in less than unique conditions.  
The second control situation involves the analyzers examining CAPTCHA images 
without first being filtered, segmented or altered in any way. The results of such a set 
would show the capabilities of analysis by itself without the benefit of pre-filtering, 
segmentation or any other noise reducing technique.  
There is also a third, nondeterministic control test in which the analyzer randomly 
attempts to guess the letters in the CAPTCHA challenge without performing any filtering 
or analysis. It has the advantage of knowing the length of the CAPTCHA and shows the 
results of randomly guessing for that one ideal case and shows the feasibility of using 
such a brute force technique.  
In addition to the control or trivial cases, there are several experiments which 
filter the images before passing them to the analyzers. Filtering experiments include 
changing various degrees of brightness and contrast as well as adding modulation. The 
specific settings for each filter were chosen based on viewing the raw images in the 
debugging tool and choosing the settings that did the best job of removing noise without 
bleaching out the letters embedded within the image for each individual CAPTCHA type.  
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The goal of the experiments is to easily break CAPTCHA. A high success rate is 
not necessary as automated software can make thousands of requests an hour. A success 
rate of 10% would be sufficient to post over 100 messages an hour, assuming over 1,000 
requests could be made within an hour. Such a rate is more that feasible on a standard 
consumer grade high speed internet connection. 
3.1.6 Results 
The first experiment results show [Figure 14; Table 1] that randomly guessing, 
even on a small and known number of letters per image, proves to have a very low 
success rate. Only individual letters are guessed correctly and never with more than a 4% 
accuracy on a set size of 1,000. Randomly guessing solutions to CAPTCHA using this 
brute force technique is simply not a viable solution. 
In the second set of experiments, the analyzers are tested against the raw 
CAPTCHA challenges without any filtering. GOCR by itself without any filtering does 
not correctly identify any full challenges except in the trivial case and even then, it only 
has a 68% success rate. In most cases, it can identify fewer that 1% of individual 
characters correctly [Figure 15; Table 2]. 
OCRAD does better in the raw test for individual characters, but not as well as 
GOCR for complete words. Counter-intuitive to the trivial results, OCRAD does do 
substantially better with the distorted images and is able to solve a very small percentage 
of challenges for both CaptchaPHP and Freecap [Figure 16; Table 3]. 
The third experiment involves adjusting the brightness of the CAPTCHA by a 
factor of ten while keeping the contrast constant. Using GOCR, adjusting the brightness 
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yielded a slight increase in word character for CaptchaPHP without increasing accuracy 
in any other categories [Figure 17; Table 4]. 
OCRAD’s character analysis of CaptchaPHP and Freecap benefitted from a ten-
point increase in brightness, as well as its word analysis of Freecap increasing its full 
word success rate to over 1% [Figure 18; Table 5]. 
The fourth experiment was similar to the third except the brightness was adjusted 
to 180 while the contrast stayed constant. By adjusting the brightness, GOCR was able to 
make significant gains in its analysis of CaptchaPHP’s challenge. Other CAPTCHAs did 
did not see an increase in correctness with the combination of GOCR and the filter 
[Figure 19; Table 6]. 
OCRAD also performed well against CaptchaPHP by adjusting the brightness to 
180. It was also able to identify a very small percentage of characters in Gotcha as well as 
increase its accuracy against the trivial case [Figure 20; Table 7]. 
The fourth experiment not only adjusted the brightness to 140, but also reduced 
the contrast to 5. With the 140/5 filter, GOCR did better in its analysis of Freecap with a 
word accuracy of 0.7%, but decreased its effectiveness of CaptchaPHP [Figure 21; Table 
8]. 
OCRAD did better against CaptchaPHP in correct letters with the 140/5 filter than 
GOCR gaining both a higher correct letter and word count, however, it was less effective 
against Freecap [Figure 22; Table 9]. 
In the fifth experiment, once again, only the brightness was increased. With a 
brightness adjustment of 160, this test places GOCR at the highest success rate of solving 
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CaptchaPHP with a correct word accuracy of 0.5%. The effect of brightness adjustment 
with CaptchaPHP seems to have the most significant effect on increasing its readability. 
Other CAPTCHAs did not see any significant rates of solvability [Figure 23; Table 10]. 
Increasing the brightness to 160 did help improve OCRAD’s correct letters 
success rate against CaptchaPHP giving it a letter accuracy of 31.0%, the highest 
accuracy in individual letters out of any other experiment. However, other filters 
provided higher accuracy in correct words [Figure 24; Table 11]. 
In the final experiment, noise reduction is used with a radius of 1 to filter the 
images. GOCR did help with correctly identifying CaptchaPHP challenges, however the 
rate of success was not as significant as other filters with only a 0.3% word accuracy for 
CaptchaPHP and 0% for the other two non-trivial tests. [Figure 25; Table 12]. 
OCRAD preformed slightly better with noise reduction than GOCR in accuracy 
of correct letters but did not do as well in correctly identifying words. As with GOCR, 
noise reduction was not as effective as other techniques [Figure 26; Table 13].
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Figure 14 - Graph of Trivial Experiment Results from Guessing 
 
 
Table 1 - Trivial Experiment Results from Guessing 
 CaptchaPHP Gotcha Freecap Trivial 
Letters Correct  4.3%  3.9%  3.5%  3.9% 
Words Correct 0 0 0 0 
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Figure 15 - Graph of Raw GOCR Test 
 
 
Table 2 - Results from Raw GOCR Test 
 CaptchaPHP Gotcha Freecap Trivial 
Letters Correct 0.6% <0.1% 1.3% 86.6% 
Words Correct 0 0 0 68.3% 
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Figure 16 - Graph of Raw OCRAD Test 
 
 
Table 3 - Results from Raw OCRAD Test 
 CaptchaPHP Gotcha Freecap Trivial 
Letters Correct 3.3% <0.1% 7.5% 79.9% 
Words Correct 0.1% 0 0.7% 31.5% 
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Figure 17 - Graph of GOCR Analysis of 110 Brightness Adjusted Image 
 
 
Table 4 - Results from GOCR Analysis of 110 Brightness Adjusted Image 
 CaptchaPHP Gotcha Freecap Trivial 
Letters Correct 1.4% <0.0% 0.9% 86.7% 
Words Correct 0.1% 0% 0% 68.6% 
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Figure 18 - Graph of OCRAD Analysis of 110 Brightness Adjusted Image 
 
 
Table 5 - Results from OCRAD Analysis of 110 Brightness Adjusted Image 
 CaptchaPHP Gotcha Freecap Trivial 
Letters Correct 6.8% <0.0% 35.6% 89.1% 
Words Correct 0.0% 0% 1.5% 56.0% 
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Figure 19 - Graph of GOCR Analysis of 180 Brightness Adjusted Image 
 
 
Table 6 - Results from GOCR Analysis of 180 Brightness Adjusted Image 
 CaptchaPHP Gotcha Freecap Trivial 
Letters Correct 12.9% <0.1% 0% 79.6% 
Words Correct 0.4% 0 0% 44.0% 
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Figure 20 - Graph of OCRAD Analysis of 180 Brightness Adjusted Image 
 
 
Table 7 - Results From OCRAD Analysis of 180 Brightness Adjusted Image 
 CaptchaPHP Gotcha Freecap Trivial 
Letters Correct 30.8% 0.8% 7.5% 93.1% 
Words Correct 0.4% 0% 0.7% 71.5% 
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Figure 21 - Graph of GOCR Analysis of 140 Brightness, 5 Contrast Adjusted Image 
 
 
Table 8 - Results From GOCR Analysis of 140 Brightness, 5 Contrast Adjusted Image 
 CaptchaPHP Gotcha Freecap Trivial 
Letters Correct 13.1% <0.0% 1.0% 86.7% 
Words Correct 0.0% 0% 0.7% 68.6% 
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Figure 22 - Graph of OCRAD Analysis of 140 Brightness, 5 Contrast Adjusted Image 
 
 
Table 9 - Results from OCRAD Analysis of 140 Brightness, 5 Contrast Adjusted Image 
 CaptchaPHP Gotcha Freecap Trivial 
Letters Correct 30.5% 0.0% 0.2% 89.5% 
Words Correct 0.4% 0% 0.0% 59.4% 
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Figure 23 - Graph of GOCR Analysis of 140 Brightness Adjusted Image 
 
 
Table 10 - Results from GOCR Analysis of 140 Brightness Adjusted Image 
 CaptchaPHP Gotcha Freecap Trivial 
Letters Correct 13.7% <0.0% 0.0% 86.4% 
Words Correct 0.5% 0% 0.0% 67.4% 
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Figure 24 - Graph of OCRAD Analysis of 160 Brightness Adjusted Image 
 
 
Table 11 - Results from OCRAD Analysis of 160 Brightness Adjusted Image 
 CaptchaPHP Gotcha Freecap Trivial 
Letters Correct 31.0% 0.3% 0.0% 90.5% 
Words Correct 0.3% 0% 0.0% 62.1% 
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Figure 25 - Graph of GOCR Analysis of Noise Reduced Image 
 
 
Table 12 - Results from GOCR Analysis of Noise Reduced Image 
 CaptchaPHP Gotcha Freecap Trivial 
Letters Correct 6.7% <0.0% 1.5% 58.3% 
Words Correct 0.3% 0% 0.0% 19.7% 
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Figure 26 - Graph of OCRAD Analysis of Noise Reduced Image 
 
 
Table 13 - Results from OCRAD Analysis of Noise Reduced Image 
 CaptchaPHP Gotcha Freecap Trivial 
Letters Correct 7.6% 0.8% 3.6% 32.8% 
Words Correct 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 
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3.2 FlickMeCaptcha 
Part of the research not only deals with trying to break existing CAPTCHA, but 
also to creating a new CAPTCHA. Previously, in section 1.4.3 Photograph Identification, 
this paper had covered an existing type of visual CAPTCHA based on using photos 
where several of the images contain kittens. To prove one is human, the user must select 
all the images which contain kittens. The disadvantage to this technique is that a very 
large selection of images is required for this type of CAPTCHA to work. It also offers no 
alternative for visually impaired users. 
The first disadvantage can be addressed by using publicly available images that 
have been pre-categorized. Rather than trying to construct an image repository that is 
static, the service Flickr from Yahoo offers a means by which regular people can upload 
photos to share over the Internet and assign them metadata known as 'tags' indicating 
information about the photos. Flickr offers a public application programming interface 
(API) to search and interact with the photo repository. With new photos being uploaded 
everyday and existing photos given new tags at the same rate, Flickr provides a very 
broad and dynamic base of photos to use in photo-based CAPTCHA. 
The application I developed as proof of concept is called FlickMeCaptcha. It is 
written in PHP and uses Flickr's representative state transfer (REST) API in order to 
perform searches for photos. It creates a CAPTCHA challenge that displays images in a 
grid from which the user must pick out images which relate to a given tag. The amount of 
images displayed is configurable within the application, but by default it displays nine 
 50 
images in a square grid. Four of the images match the given tag and at least three of them 
must be selected for the challenge to be answered correctly [Figure 27]. 
 
 
Figure 27 - FlickMeCaptcha 
 
FlickMeCaptcha can retrieve the tags it uses in two ways. The first way is to use a 
predefined list stored in a text file with the application. The second is that it can retrieve 
the most popular tags on Flickr and randomly select from the set of popular tags. Using a 
text file has the distinct disadvantage of having a statically defined set of tags. Without a 
sufficiently large list, it may be possible to circumvent the CAPTCHA simply by 
examining all photos with a given tag. Popular tags may seem like an obviously better 
choice, however there are many cases where popular tags have nothing to do with the 
content of the photograph. For instance, one popular tag is "Cannon10kn" which referees 
not to the photo itself, but to what camera was used to take it. 
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3.3 Non-CAPTCHA based SPAM Defense 
Several services have arisen to combat SPAM, not by using CAPTCHA to ensure 
the poster is human, but by analyzing the content of the message in the same way e-mail 
filters work. Many of these services are free to use for non-profits and individual. 
Companies that provide the services pull in revenue to sustain themselves by offering 
commercial licenses. In my research I've examined the following three services: Akismet 
[13], Mollom [14] and Defensio [15].   
Akismet is a service that analyzes blog and forum comments to determine if a 
particular message is SPAM or a legitimate interactive post from a human (what its 
designers refer to as "Ham"). Submissions to the service return a true or false indicating if 
the post is SPAM. Many popular content management systems such as WordPress and 
Drupal have plugins that run all user submitted content through Akismet's service. 
According to Akismet's statistics page which is continually updated, as of 
February 2009, Akismet has caught over 9.8 billion SPAM messages while allowing 1.8 
billion Ham messages [30]. The service interface allows site maintainers to mark false 
negatives and false positives, although quantities of such identifications do not appear on 
the overall statistics page. The inner workings of Akismet are kept mostly secret in order 
to prevent malicious users from "gaming the system [31]." 
Criticism has been raised about Akismet flagging Ham comments as false 
positives for SPAM. A blogger, that goes by the pseudonym "timetheif," posted the 
following about Akismet in early 2008: 
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"Although I have never experienced this problem before, as of yesterday 
the comments that I leave on wordpress.com blogs where I have 
previously been approved did not appear immediately after I posted them. 
I became suspicious and did some investigation and found that the 
comments are ending up in the Akismet spam filter. Thus far raincoaster, 
sulz, thesacredpath and several other bloggers have found my comments 
in the Akismet filter and fished them out [32]." 
 
An alternative to Akismet is Mollom, which also has plugins for several major 
content and blogging engines. As of February 2009, Mollom has claims to have caught 
33.9 million SPAM messages with an average efficiency of 99.95%, meaning that only 5 
in every 10,000 SPAM messages are not caught [33]. It is very similar to Akismet in the 
sense that is it a web based service that is free for non-commercial use and sustains itself 
with licensing for commercial and enterprise use.   
Defensio is yet another direct competitor to Akismet and Mollom with a similar 
suite of plugins for major content engines and a free for non-commercial use license. In 
January of 2009, Defensio was acquired by Websense [34]. Unlike its competitors, 
Defensio does not offer a statistics page on its website to show the amount of SPAM its 
filter has blocked.      
It is difficult to get accurate numbers for false-positives when it comes to 
CAPTCHA SPAM protection since oftentimes a user with visual disabilities may have 
several failed attempted before successfully being able to post a message or may give up 
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in frustration altogether. Although there are more statistics gathered for non-CAPTCHA 
based approaches, and such approaches have a more reliable way of determining false-
positives (i.e. humans marking incorrectly flagged messages), there still seems to be no 
reasonable means by which to compare the two techniques.  
The advantages of using a non-CAPTCHA based technique for preventing SPAM 
include the ability for visually impaired individuals to easily post messages as well as 
reducing the burden of the end users for proving that they are in fact human. The 
drawback is the possibility of false-positives and the requirement of website 
administrators to occasionally check responses marked as SPAM. This may become 
impractical for sites with heavy amounts of traffic such as bulletin boards or websites 
with significant amounts of comments. The advantages of either technique are not easily 
measurable or comparable due to the difficulty in creating controlled SPAM 
environments, difficulty in the collection of statistics on CAPTCHA based systems 
without human interactive studies and the closed source nature of non-CAPTCHA based 
alternatives. 
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Chapter 4 – Analysis 
4.1 Degree of Success for the BMCB Engine 
Examining the BMCB Engine, the best-case results with optimized filters show 
success rates ranging from 1 in 1000 to 3 in 1000. Although this may seem like a very 
low rate of success, the requests to web servers are automated and most web servers are 
designed to handle very large volumes of simultaneous connections. To determine if such 
a success rate is adequate to post large amounts of SPAM, the connection and transfer 
times must be examined as well.   
Given that the average broadband connection within the United States is 
approximately 1.9Mbps [35], a CAPTCHA the size of 1 to 5 kilobytes would take less 
than a second to transfer at that speed, but the connection to the web server itself is 
expensive. Although most web servers support pipelining, that is the ability to stream 
multiple requests on a single connection, answering a CAPTCHA challenge requires a 
request for the image followed by a response to the server, which must then terminate.  
Connection times can vary greatly depending on the server being access and 
network congestion. Assuming a modest average case connection time of two seconds, it 
is reasonable to assume at worst it would take five seconds (two per request and one to 
download the image itself) to request and respond to a website with a CAPTCHA 
challenge.  
This would mean 12 requests could be completed per minute or over 700 per 
hour. With success rates using the engine at under 1 in 1000, this would mean at most, 
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only one SPAM message could be posted per hour. If the assumption is given that there is 
a very fast connection with minimal delay to a web server, and the entire 
request/response process only took one second, over 3,000 requests could be handled per 
hour allowing for the possibility of posting up to 3 messages an hour.   
Since it's been established that the return rate for SPAM is very low, at best 1 in 
1,000 and at worst 1 in 1,000,000 [19], a dedicated system in the best-case scenario of 
one response per second would be required to run for over 10 days in order to get a single 
return for SPAM posting efforts.  
Although adding additional computers could increase the effectiveness of 
breaking CAPTCHA, the cost would still be prohibitive. The research given here shows 
that using open source and freely available image recognition and OCR analysis tools 
does not yield a high enough rate of return to be useful in producing SPAM messages. 
Furthermore, examining the results shows that specific sets of filters can yield 
better results for one CAPTCHA while making results worse for another. For example, 
CaptchaPHP had the greatest success rate of 0.5% resulting from GOCR analysis 
combined with a 140 brightness adjustment. In the same experiment, Freecap had a 
success rate of 0%. Freecap's highest success rate was 1.5% using OCRAD analysis with 
a brightness adjustment of 110. In the same experiment CaptchaPHP had a success rate of 
0%. This shows that filters and analysis must be specifically targeted to a given type of 
CAPTCHA.  
In the case of the Gotcha CAPTCHA, not a single experiment was able to get 
even one challenge solved. Some experiments were able to correctly identify some letters 
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with success rates in the range of less than 0.1% to 0.8%, however the trivial test which, 
attempts to randomly guess the challenge without performing any type of analysis had a 
higher character success rate of 3.9%. This shows that for this one CAPTCHA, randomly 
guessing the challenge's answer has a higher rate of success than actually trying to 
analyze the image. Researchers have shown particular CAPTCHAs may be solvable, but 
to do so would require specific and directed effort into analysis of that particular 
CAPTCHA. There is, as of yet, no general algorithm that is effective against all 
challenges. Therefore small and moderately sized websites, blogs and message boards are 
reasonably protected from SPAM with CAPTCHA. Only large sites, where the potential 
for financial gain to outweigh the substantial research and development cost in breaking 
CAPTCHA, need to be concerned with such attacks. 
4.2 Pros and Cons of FlickMeCaptcha 
FlickMeCaptcha is an improvement over existing implementations of image 
based CAPTCHA such as KittenAuth. There are several advantages including the 
following: 
• Availability of large selection of constantly growing images for challenges 
• Ability to select random tags from the most popular set on Flickr 
• Many configurable options including number of images to display and 
number of correct images that must be selected 
• Ability to use a predefined wordlist  
Although FlickMeCaptcha does solve some problems with photo-based 
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CAPTCHA, the largest concern being the base of images from which to chose from, it 
does bring up some new problems of its own. They include the following: 
• Most popular tags on Flickr often do not represent anything in the image 
(e.g. a tag indicating the camera model used to take the photo) 
• Copyright constraints restrict the available images to those licensed under 
the creative commons 
• The current implementation makes several successive calls to the REST 
service instead of utilizing HTTP pipelines, causing a performance delay 
Overall, the gains in photo-based CAPTCHA are significant and the script is more 
of a proof of concept that can be expanded upon and easily integrated into content 
management software and blogging engines. 
4.3 Filtering versus CAPTCHA 
Studying the alternatives to CAPTCHA resulted in finding a number of web 
service based filters with open programming implementations than can be used by many 
different types of content management software. Although many of the implementations 
provided general and overall statistics, none of them provided more detailed numbers that 
could be filtered or used to drill-down specifics. Due to this, studying the effectiveness of 
these approaches versus CAPTCHA becomes difficult. Akismet staff has even stated 
publicly that such studies would be ineffective [36]. 
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Chapter 5 – Contributions to the Field 
The crux of the research presented in this thesis comes from two programs 
specifically written for expanding knowledge of the field of CAPTCHA and SPAM 
prevention. Both programs are released as open source and will continue to be available 
for developers and researchers to expand upon. The first program is the BMCB Engine 
whose audience is specifically developers and researchers who want to test techniques for 
attaching and breaking CAPTCHAs. The second program is FlickMeCaptcha, a program 
intended for web developers and end users to provide a new image based CAPTCHA that 
can not easily be solved. 
5.1 BMCB Engine 
Although the BMCB Engine did not meet the measure of success proposed, that is 
the ability to solve CAPTCHA at a success rate necessary to post large amounts of 
SPAM in a reasonable amount of time using freely available filtering and analysis 
programs, it did provide some insights and contributions to others attempting the same 
type of research. 
The results show that it is possible to use image filtering in combination with 
existing OCR tools to solve current CAPTCHAs automatically without the need of a 
human and in effect defeating the purpose of the test. However, since the percentages for 
success are so low, website administrators could protect themselves simply by installing 
software or hardware that tracks repetitive and continual network requests. Such software 
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is often used to prevent Denial of Service attacks. If such a system were in place, an 
attacker would need to use some type of distributed network or a set of computers 
compromised with a virus to effectively carry out an attack.   
Furthermore, the attack must be targeted towards specific types of CAPTCHA. In 
the existing studies published, the algorithms used were specific websites and CAPTCHA 
scripts. The engine, along with results from existing research, show that filtering works 
best when it is target to a specific image challenge. There has been no evidence to show 
that it would be easy, nor is it currently possible, to generate an all-purpose analyzer that 
would be capable of decoding all types of CAPTCHA as well as a human could. 
The analyzers and filters that come with the engine I developed are very basic and 
rely on existing, publicly available and free open source tools, yet still yield viable 
results. The advantage of using existing tools is that the engine itself is designed to be 
easily extendable, dynamic and can be adapted to facilitate other research with more 
complex algorithms. In its current state, it can be released to the public without large 
ethical concerns. It is my hope that this contribution to the open source community will 
help further future innovations and will be a useful tool for others who are interested in 
the field.  
5.2 FlickMeCaptcha 
FlickMeCaptcha provides a new tool that can be implemented by website 
designers to provide a new type of CAPTCHA to end-users. Although it uses the concept 
of photo-based challenges, which have been implemented before, the means by which it 
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acquires photos is innovative and provides a much larger and constantly changing base 
than previous implementations. 
The are several advantages for using FlickMeCaptcha including a very large, 
constantly changing base of images that can be displayed in different sizes and are fairly 
easy to identify. The interface is fully customizable with Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) 
and the project is open source, so it is free to modify, and the tags used are stored in a 
plain text file that can easily be modified.  
There are also disadvantages of using FlickMeCaptcha. The option to use popular 
tags instead of a list is not very useful due to many tags not relating to the photos directly. 
There is also the possibility that individuals have given photos tags that don’t necessarily 
relate to them in an intuitive way, meaning the user may have to attempt to solve the 
CAPTCHA several times before being given a relevant set of images. FlickMeCaptcha is 
also limited to photos on Flickr that are copyright free, limiting the potential base of 
images. This can be changed in the setup but may cause legal problems. Finally, there is 
no built-in alternative for the visually impaired, so FlickMeCaptcha would have to be 
paired with another approach to be inclusive to those with disabilities.   
5.3 Conclusion 
Analyzing the problem of SPAM and the solution on CAPTCHA does not address 
the core problem that allows SPAM to propagate and be as invasive as it is. The core 
problem with SPAM is its success rate. Even with only a return of fifty responses to 
every million SPAM messages sent [37], the model is still economically viable because 
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the messages themselves cost virtually nothing to send. The cost to bandwidth, computer 
security and the massive infrastructure that must be put in place to deal with SPAM is 
detrimental to growth on the Internet.  
Although CAPTCHA has been and will continue to be a viable solution, with new 
and innovative forms of CAPTCHA improving human success rates while being 
increasingly effective against automated attacks, the main problem is that SPAM will 
continue as long as there is a consumer response, no matter how minuscule. In order to 
remove the need for CAPTCHA and other SPAM prevention techniques, Internet users 
need to be more informed about identifying SPAM so as to not purchase products, and 
thereby grant legitimacy, to websites that use SPAM based promotions, to the degree that 
the return rate of SPAM becomes financially unviable. 
Individuals have been running mass advertisements and scams using regular 
postal mail for decades before the age of the Internet. The greater problem of increasing 
awareness and social intelligence is well beyond the scope of this thesis. However, in the 
meantime, the innovations that have come about through combating unsolicited e-mail, 
viruses and malicious website attacks have been invaluable. Security research in both the 
fields of prevention and circumvention have led to powerful innovations in machine 
learning that have been of great benefit to the Computer Science community.  
5.4 Future Work 
Several areas of research exist which can be built on top of the results outlined in 
this thesis.  These areas of research include enhancing the existing analysis engine, 
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expanding FlickMeCaptcha, and performing research on humans’ ability to correctly 
respond to CAPTCHA challenges versus that of a machine.  
The engine is licensed under the GNU General Public License (GNU GPL) 
version 3, making it freely available for others to view, modify, enhance, learn from and 
redistribute. Although the engine itself is structured to be a comprehensive testing 
platform, the filters and analyzers themselves are not very strong. Since the engine is 
written in Java and has several extendable abstract base classes, it can easily be expanded 
to use new analysis algorithms and filtration techniques. Full guides for installing the 
engine and developing with it are located in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively. 
Along with studying existing CAPTCHAs, additional research is also warranted 
in creating new CAPTCHA challenge techniques. FlickMeCaptcha is a wonderful proof 
of concept, but it still has room for development. Features that could be developed for it 
include an alternative CAPTCHA, either audio or word puzzle, for the visually impaired, 
using pipelined connections to speed up response time (versus making multiple 
connections to Flickr’s REST service) and a better means for choosing relevant tags.   
Since no human studies were conducted for this thesis, another area of research 
would involve human interaction with CAPTCHA and examine people’s success rate in 
answering CAPTCHA challenges correctly in correlation to their age demographics and 
visual impairments. Such research, in conjunction with computer analysis, could show 
which techniques work better for humans and against automated programs.  
The research in this thesis is one stepping stone in the complex fields of image 
filtering and analysis. My hope is that the research presented in this thesis will help other 
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researchers continue to examine and enhance CAPTCHA challenges and improve 
security and protection against SPAM. 
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Formatting Conventions  
Filenames and paths to specific files will be listed in italics: 
/usr/bin/vi 
Commands that are intended to be typed in verbatim are represented in mono-type: 
mysql 
CREATE TABLE Bmcb; 
Variables or options in commands will be specified using mono-type combined with 
brackets and underlines:  
./runCommand.sh [dryRun | fullTest ] 
Class names that are traditionally camel cased in code are separated out into individual 
words with each leading character capitalized and kept in the standard font: 
Image Magick Filter Test Workflow.  
Code inline with the paragraphs will be displayed in monotype with function names 
ended with parenthesizes. 
  myFunction() 
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Appendix A – Installing the Engine 
The core of the engine is written in Java and it accesses several external programs 
to perform tasks. Although many of the external programs are portable and the 
application should be able to run on any system, it was primarily developed and tested on 
a Linux system. The requirements listed below are for the configuration I used during 
testing. BMCB may work with older or newer versions of the tools listed and customized 
versions may not require all the tools listed for filtering and analysis.  
Requirements and Dependencies 
• Java 1.5 or higher runtime environment and compiler 
• PHP for CAPTCHA generation (any recent build of PHP 4 or 5 with gd support 
should work) 
• MySQL 5.0.26 or higher 
• ImageMagick 6.4 or higher 
• Apache Ant 1.7.0 or higher 
Downloading the Source Files 
The latest version of the BMCB engine, as well as this installation document, can 
be found at http://penguindreams.org/page/see/Bmcb  
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Unpacking the Source Files 
After downloading and saving the compressed source file, open a terminal and 
change to the directory it was saved to. Then run the tar command with appropriate 
parameters to extract the archive, replacing <version> with the appropriate version of the 
application. 
tar xvfj Bmcb-<version>.tar.bz2 
Compiling the Engine 
An ant build file is included to easily compile the engine into a single jar file. To 
start the compilation, run the ant application in the currently working directory where the 
source code was extracted.  
ant jar 
Setting up the Database 
An instance of MySQL must be running either on the system the engine is 
installed onto or on a remote server. For the purposes of this installation, it is assumed the 
engine and MySQL server are on the same computer.  
A database must be created for the engine, permissions must be assigned to the 
database and the schema for the engine must be imported. This can all be done from the 
MySQL command line utility which can be run by simply running mysql from the 
command prompt. If a root password has been defined, you may have to run mysql -u 
root -p and then enter your password when prompted. From the prompt, run the create 
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and grant statements necessary to establish the database and issue permissions on it. 
CREATE DATABASE bmcb; 
GRANT ALL ON bmcb.* TO 'bmcb'@'localhost' IDENTIFIED BY 'bmcbdb'; 
The Configuration Files 
Logging is provided using the Log4j libraries. The engine tries to locate the 
log4j.property file in the current working directory. The default configuration should be 
adequate for most users. To further tune the logging, documentation for log4j can be 
found at http://logging.apache.org/log4j/1.2/.  
Program specific configuration settings are found in the bmcb.config file located 
in the programs current working directory. It contains path names, database attributes and 
various other runtime configuration options needed for the engine. It will need to be 
adjusted for the particular environment on which it is installed.  
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Attribute Description 
db_host Hostname of Database Server 
db_user Database Username 
db_password Database Password 
db_database Name of Database to use 
db_port Database port 
cp_generators Directory containing CAPTCHA generators 
cp_setdirs Directory to write dataset images 
cp_tmpdirs Directory to store temporary data 
cp_results Directory to store result graphs 
cp_imagemagick Full path to directory containing 
ImageMagick executables 
an_ocrad Full path to OCRAD executable 
an_gocr Full path to GOCR executable 
Running the Program 
The application can be run directly from the jar file so long as it is run from the 
directory which contains the /lib directory. If the application jar needs to be relocated 
outside of the distribution directory, the manifest.txt must be modified to contain the path 
to the external libraries located in /lib and the application must be recompiled. To run the 
 75 
engine, execute the jar file. 
 java -java Bmcb.jar 
Running the jar will produce a usage statement. 
Usage: Bmcb [generate|trivialTest|magickTest|SegmentDebug] 
By default, BMCB can run several of the built-in workflows included with the 
application. They include a generation workflow for creating CAPTCHA datasets and 
two testing workflows for analyzing CAPTCHA and generating results. Using the 
SegmentDebug option will start the graphical debugging tool displaying generated 
datasets.  
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Appendix B – High Level Overview of the Engine 
Looking at the engine from the top down, all the tasks that are performed are in 
the form of workflows. Workflows can be used to generate sets of CAPTCHAs to test 
against or perform testing and analysis and gather statistics. A workflow is just a simple 
Java class that is used to call all the other components of the framework. They can be 
highly customizable to perform any type of experiment and have full access to all the 
other public components in the framework. 
 Components accessible from the workflows include a variety of tools for 
experiments including CAPTCHA generators, image filters, segmentators and analyzers. 
Storage of generated datasets can be handled using the database classes and a variety of 
static utility functions exist for the purpose of loading images, converting image types, 
logging and generating result graphs [Figure 28]. 
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Figure 28 - High Level Overview of BMCB Engine 
Generators  
The Abstract Generator class provides the basis for any type of generator. The 
primary included generator is the Command Line Generator, which calls an external 
program with two arguments, the first being the text to be placed in the image and the 
second being the directory to write the image to. The Abstract Generator can also be 
extended for other purposes such as generation via an HTTP request, in the case where 
the CAPTCHA is generated on a non-UNIX machine such as from an active server page 
(ASP), or a Java based generator which uses existing Java classes to generate a 
CAPTCHA.  
CAPTCHA programs typically generate their challenge image text randomly. 
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Within the engine the text to be generated needs to be controlled in order to determine if 
the analysis of the text is correct. The generated text is still random, but the correct 
response needs to be stored in a database for comparison. Because of this, CAPTCHA 
generators need to be modified slightly in order to work correctly with the generator 
classes. For this reason, it is best to use open source CAPTCHA programs which can 
easily be modified and adapted to work with the engine.  
Segmentators 
Segmentators are based off the Abstract Segmentator class. They are given the 
argument of an image and are expected to return either a series of axes where a break 
between letters would occur or an array of image objects that have been pre-segmented. 
A given segmentation algorithm will extend this class and implement all the abstract 
methods.  
Filters  
All filters are based on the Abstract Filter class. A filter is a preprocessor for an 
image before it is used with a segmentator or analyzer. It takes in an image object and 
applies some algorithm to the image to attempt to clean up general noise and distortion. 
The filter is applied directly on the image passed into this object, so if an original copy is 
needed for any purpose, it should be made before the filter is applied. 
Analyzers  
Analyzers are based off the Abstract Analyzer class. They perform the core of the 
analysis process and can act upon either an entire image or an array of image segments. 
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Abstract functions are also defined for learning and training the analyzer if a learning 
style algorithm is used. Implementations of this class can chose to throw an Analysis Not 
Supported Exception in cases where a particular algorithm may not have the ability to 
learn or to accept image segments.    
Workflows 
Workflows are based on the Abstract Workflow class. They have an execution 
method and are used to knit together all the steps and individual pieces necessary to 
perform a task. For example, the Generator Workflow is executed to look through every 
available CAPTCHA generator and create datasets for testing. Workflows can be used to 
run a particular set of tasks for an experiment using a given set of images, segmentators, 
filters and analyzers, as well as calculate the results.  
Utility Classes 
Several utility classes also exist to help deal with miscellaneous tasks required 
through the course of the program. They include common application classes such as 
those needed for reading configuration files and application logging as well as more 
program specific classes for loading and storing images in various formats and rendering 
charts and graphs from result sets. 
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Appendix C – Developing with the Engine  
The BMCB Engine is comprised of several components including the Generators, 
Segmentators, Image Filters, Analyzers and Utilities. All these components are called 
within a Workflow. New workflows must be added to the entry point of the program. 
This guide is intended for developers who want to modify the engine for their own 
analysis techniques and build new experiments into the engine.  
This document follows a bottom up approach focusing on the individual 
components and building them into a full experiment or workflow. Many useful 
examples are included with the engine itself and should be read alongside this document 
to gain a full understanding of how to build new experiments into the existing 
framework.  
Utility Classes 
There are several independent utility classes contained within the framework that 
are used throughout the application. Many of these classes contain static standalone 
methods for basic tasks such as image conversion, logging, configuration, result graphing 
and various other common tasks [Figure 29 - Diagram of Utility Classes].  
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Figure 29 - Diagram of Utility Classes 
 
Some of the more important utilities are as follows: 
• Application Logger: This class is called from many of the abstract classes in the 
framework to initialize a protected log variable. Developers shouldn’t need to call 
this directly unless they create a new class from scratch, as the existing log 
variable is accessible in nearly every abstract class. Examples for creating new 
instances are located in the abstract classes.  
• Image Loader: This class contains several functions to assist with image 
manipulation including image loading, converting between Images and Buffered 
Images, determining the path of an image from a dataset, converting images to 
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PNM files used by OCR programs, and drawing lines on segment boundaries on 
images to be used with the Segment Viewer debugging tool. 
• Process Executor: A simple class to handle the basic task of running an external 
process 
• Config Map: Used to read settings from the bmcb.property file 
Generators 
The engine comes with a command line generation class which passes two 
arguments to a command line application, the first being the CAPTCHA to be produced 
and the second being the location for the output file. This process can be seen in the built-
in generation workflow where random challenge/responses are generated, stored in a 
database and then generated for each CAPTCHA type. 
Typically, a CAPTCHA application generates its challenge randomly and does 
not accept a challenge as an argument.  Therefore, the CAPTCHA script needs to be 
modified. For the purposes of using this engine, it is best to use open source CAPTCHAs 
which can easily be modified. The following changes may be necessary before using a 
CAPTCHA script with this engine: 
• Modify the program to take in the CAPTCHA phrase as the first argument 
• Write the output to a file given by the second argument 
• Adjust the front path to be independent from the script’s location 
The following examples detail how these three modifications can be performed in 
a typical PHP based CAPTCHA script. Each CAPTCHA script a developer wants to 
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incorporate will require different modifications to be compatible with the built in 
Command Line Generator, or it may require a custom generator.  
Modifying the CAPTCHA application to take the input from a command line, 
rather than generating it randomly, can be done in several ways. The developer can 
modify the function that generates the random CAPTCHA or the point at which the key 
is saved to the session can be modified [Figure 30].   
 
 
Figure 30 - Modification to Gotcha to Take Challenge Input 
 
Most CAPTCHA scripts have a function used to generate a random phrase or set 
of letters. This section is what must be modified in order to use the script with the engine. 
The type of modification will vary depending on the programming language used and 
may require the creation of a customized generation class.  
Typically, most CAPTCHA scripts are designed to output directly to a web 
browser. This behavior must also be modified to write the file, with the challenge 
solution as the filename, to a directory [Figure 31]. As with the previous modification, 
this will vary heavily depending on the programming language of the script and the script 
itself. 
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Figure 31 - Modification of Freecap to Output Challenge to a File 
 
Another modification that may or may not be necessary involves modifying the 
path for included and dependent files. For many of the scripts included with the engine, 
this involves modifying the statement that declared which font to use to be working 
directory independent [Figure 32].  
 
 
Figure 32 - Modification of Gotcha for Font Path 
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The above modification may or may not be necessary depending on the way the 
script loads its fonts and dependencies.  
The above modifications are only some of the changes that may need to be made 
to a CAPTCHA application in order to get it to work with the engine. Developers may 
run into other challenges, however most CAPTCHA should be adaptable, either by 
extending the Abstract Command Line Generator or by creating a custom generator class, 
so long as the CAPTCHA application provides some means for manually inputting the 
challenge response.  
Image Filters 
Image Filters extend the Abstract Filter class. They must modify a Buffered 
Image that is passed to the filter by reference. If the calling class requires an unaltered 
version of the Buffered Image, it must clone a copy before passing it to the filter.  
 
 
Figure 33 - Class Diagram for Filters 
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In addition, if a new Buffered Image is created during the filtering process, it can 
be copied into the passed in argument. An example is the function for edge filtering 
which returns a new Buffered Image object[Figure 34]. 
 
 
Figure 34 - Copying One Buffered Image to Another 
Segmentators 
Segmentators are based on the Abstract Segmentator class. An instance of all the 
segmentator objects is created specifically for an image. Derived classes must implement 
the abstract getSegmentAxes() function which returns the x coordinate where the 
image is split into separate vertical segments. Various other functions in the base class 
can be called to split the image into individual arrays of Buffered Image objects to be 
used within the workflows [Figure 35].  
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Figure 35 - Class Diagram for Segmentators  
Analyzers  
Analyzers are what actually try to solve the CAPTCHA challenge after 
appropriate filters and segmentation have been applied. The Abstract Analyzer has been 
designed to contain several functions in the case of learning and non-learning algorithms 
as well as different functions for analyzing segments as opposed to full images. 
Analyzers which do not support a given abstract function can choose to throw an 
Analysis Not Supported Exception. An abstract Command Line Analyzer has been 
included to assist in the process of calling an external application for analysis [Figure 36].  
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Figure 36 - Class Diagram for Analyzers 
Workflows 
The piece that ties all the individual components together is the workflow. The 
workflow calls all the individual pieces listed so far and can be used for generation of set 
data, analysis or any various other tasks. The workflows included with the engine are 
used for data generation, analysis and testing. Developers will want to either modify 
existing workflows or create new workflows for whatever experiments they may wish to 
perform [Figure 37].  
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Figure 37 - Class Diagram for Workflows 
 
The Abstract Workflow class contains a protected runSpecifc() function 
which takes in all the individual components including a Segmentator, Filter and 
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Analyzer, along with a description for results and logging purposes, and runs them 
against all the currently available datasets.  
Entry Point 
The BMCBMain class provides the primary entry point for the application. After 
creating additional workflows, an appropriate command line argument or set of command 
line arguments will be need to be added to the main function to kick off the workflow.  
Visual Debugging Tools 
There is also a Segment Viewer packaged with the engine. It is a graphical tool to 
view data sets as well as the results from segmentators, image filters and analyzers 
[Figure 38]. Newly created Segmentators, Analyzers and Image Filters can easily be 
added to the Segment Viewer.  
 
 
Figure 38 - Visual Debugger 
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Appendix D – FlickMeCaptcha 
Installation 
The most current version of FlickMeCaptcha can be found at 
http://penguindreams.org/projects/flickmecaptcha in the download section. Simply 
download the appropriate tar file and extract it to a working directory.  
tar xvfj flickmecaptcha-<version>.tar.gz 
The compressed tar file contains FlickMeCaptcha.php which is the primary script 
and only one necessary to integrate the application into an existing website. There is also 
a script named example.php which shows how to integrate the application into a form and 
provides a means for testing the application on a web server. 
There are several configuration options,, which can be set in the 
FlickMeCaptcha.php file. Most of these options can be left at their default. The only 
setting which must be changed is the scriptFile variable which must point to the 
web path where the script is located. Other variables purposes and settings are 
documented within the script file itself.  
Integration 
To present the CAPTCHA within a web form, the FlickMeCaptcha.php script 
must be included in the current PHP file followed by a call to the getChallenge() 
function [Figure 39]. Please note that the session must be started using the 
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session_start() function in PHP before creating or verifying the CAPTCHA.  
 
 
Figure 39 - Adding FlickMeCaptcha to a Form 
 
Once the form has been submitted, the CAPTCHA can be verified for correctness 
using the checkChallenge() function [Figure 40]. 
 
 
Figure 40 - Verifying FlickMeCaptcha Challenge 
